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SB 206: THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR 
ATHLETIC EXPLOITATION 
Rachel Rosenblum* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
College campuses are a mecca of unparalleled growth, education, 
sports, and excitement for students, alumni, and fans around the 
country. Millions of people gather around their televisions or stadiums 
to support their favorite collegiate team, garnering billions of dollars 
for their respective university and the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA).1 However, there is an insidious problem rearing 
its ugly head underneath the prestige and glory of idealized collegiate 
athletes and their highly competitive programs: athletic 
compensation.2 
Scholarships provide a means to further the goals of amateurism: 
to uphold an athlete’s education, shield them from exploitation, and 
protect against an unprofessional athletic environment.3 Today’s 
athletic climate, however, is cluttered with big business. It is an 
industry, littered with the controlling mark of large-scale commercial 
 
 * Rachel Rosenblum, J.D. Candidate 2021, Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law 
School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science, Strategic Communication with honors, magna cum 
laude, Elon University,  May 2018. Special thanks to Dean Waterstone who sponsored this Note. 
 1. Steve Cameron, The NCAA Brings in $1 Billion a Year—Here’s Why It Refuses to Pay Its 
College Athletes, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2019, 7:14 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ncaa-
college-athletes-march-madness-basketball-football-sports-not-paid-2019-3. 
 2. See generally Audrey C. Sheetz, Note, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA: Preserving 
Amateurism in College Sports Amidst the Fight for Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865 
(2016) (arguing a regulated form of compensation in college athletics does not diminish the student-
athletes’ amateurism). 
 3. Id. at 871 (NCAA bylaws state college athletics are “designed to be an integral part of the 
educational program.” “In line with these values, the NCAA prohibits student-athletes from 
receiving compensation in order to protect them from ‘exploitation by professional and commercial 
enterprises.’” (quoting NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL 4, 57 (2013), http://fordhamsports.com/custompages/compliace/forms/CoachComplianc
e/2013-14%20NCAA%20Manual.pdf [http://perma.cc/HT58-V46E])). See generally Caitlin D. 
Buckstaff, Note, Covering the Spread: An Assessment of Amateurism and Vulnerability of Student-
Athletes in an Emerging Culture of Sports Wagering, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 133 (2013) 
(arguing that applying a definition of amateurism premised on the prohibition of compensation 
harms rather than protects student-athletes). 
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corruption, that generates a significant amount of monetary 
compensation for the university and its associated entities.4 
Amateurism may in fact be noble, but it does not result in fair revenue 
sharing, especially for those individuals most responsible for the 
profits.5 The universities, NCAA, and other marketing conglomerates 
generate significant capital through the exploitation of collegiate 
“amateur athletes.”6 This unethical profiteering transpires under the 
veil of a system designed to prevent exactly those actions. 
“The typical Division I college football player devotes 43.3 hours 
per week to his sport—3.3 more hours than the typical American work 
week.”7 The top twenty-four Division I schools make more than $100 
million annually, with Texas A&M totaling $192.6 million in 
revenue.8 Additionally, the NCAA annually makes $1 billion.9 This 
massive profit is built off of the hours and hours of sweat and work 
college athletes are giving to their school.10 The NCAA and individual 
universities plaster images of their athletes all over campuses, social 
media, and virtually all media outlets.11 In return, athletes receive only 
an education, an education in which they may miss more than a quarter 
of their classes and are effectively unable to work part-time.12 
 
 4. Brittany Jacobs, College Athletic Departments: The Business Behind It All, BLEACHER 
REPORT (Nov. 12, 2009), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/289199-college-athletic-departments-
the-business-behind-it-all. 
 5. See generally Craig Garthwaite et al., Who Profits from Amateurism? Rent-Sharing in 
Modern College Sports 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 27734, 2020) 
(finding collegiate athletics largely bar student-athletes from sharing in revenues generated by their 
participation and create substantial economic rents for the universities). 
 6. See generally Andy Schwarz, Mo’ne Davis and Exploiting Exploitation, VICE (Oct. 24, 
2014, 4:19 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pg54p8/mone-davis-and-exploiting-
exploitation (arguing the NCAA’s prohibition on compensating student-athletes is “antiquated” and 
cheats young athletes “out of the four best athletic earning years of their lives”). 
 7. Marc Edelman, 21 Reasons Why Student-Athletes Are Employees and Should Be Allowed 
to Unionize, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2014, 10:11 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/201
4/01/30/21-reasons-why-student-athletes-are-employees-and-should-be-allowed-to-unionize. 
 8. NCAA Finances: 2018–19 Finances, USA TODAY, https://sports.usatoday.com/ 
ncaa/finances (last visited Apr. 11, 2021); Steve Berkowitz, Texas A&M’s $192.6 Million in 
Revenue Puts It in College Sports Elite, USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2016, 2:22 PM), https://www.usat
oday.com/story/sports/college/2016/01/30/texas-a-m-joins-college-sports-financial-
elite/79567194/. 
 9. Cameron, supra note 1. 
 10. See Sheetz, supra note 2, at 865–66. 
 11. See id. at 891. 
 12. Edelman, supra note 7; Jon Solomon, 10 Ways College Athletes Can Get Paid and Remain 
Eligible for Their Sport, CBS SPORTS (June 21, 2016, 5:20 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/colle
ge-football/news/10-ways-college-athletes-can-get-paid-and-remain-eligible-for-their-sport/ 
(“The NCAA allows players to have paying jobs. They may rarely have the time to do so, but it is 
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This idea of a subpar education as compensation for excessive 
work hours is one of the past. California citizens have voted in support 
of Senate Bill 206 (“SB 206”), which gives college athletes the right 
to their name and likeness.13 While a small step, it is one that 
represents a drastic change in public policy and the public’s outlook 
on amateurism and employment law. SB 206 is intended as the first 
step towards compensation for the employment-like conditions of 
high-performing college athletes.14 While it does not go far enough, 
nor does it protect the students from other potential exploitation, it is 
a step in the right direction to remedy employment issues of high-level 
athletes. 
II.  HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS 
To understand the issues surrounding SB 206’s conception and 
its continued problems, the history of the NCAA, Scholarships, and 
amateurism must be understood and explored. The NCAA and affiliate 
organizations have created a world where athletes dedicate themselves 
to an amateur career void of compensation.15 Compensation, as 
referred to for collegiate athletes, is an intricate term with debatable 
meaning. Amateurism has incorrectly labelled “compensation” as a 
dirty word.16 The landscape is simple—scholarships are coveted by 
young athletes and the NCAA and universities use them as a guise of 
protection.17 In reality, those in charge are seeing extreme profit, while 
those they pretend to protect, student athletes, are exploited.18 This 
section highlights the NCAA’s massive control over young athletes, 
along with the actual meaning, both socially and legally, behind 
college scholarships and athletic compensation. 
A comprehensive understanding of such topics is inherently 
necessary to understand the legal atmosphere of collegiate athletics. 
Without such background, it is impossible to understand the courts’ 
 
permitted if the work is performed at an amount comparable to the going rate in that area for similar 
services.”). 
 13. S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 14. CAL. S., HISTORY OF SENATE BILL NO. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 15. See generally Schwarz, supra note 6 (finding college athletes are being exploited because 
most athletes will not go on to make money playing sports after college). 
 16. David A. Grenardo, The Continued Exploitation of the College Athlete: Confessions of a 
Former College Athlete Turned Law Professor, 95 OR. L. REV. 223, 237 (2016). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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rulings or lack thereof regarding amateurism laws, and the future 
direction they may take. 
A.  The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
The NCAA website states, “the NCAA was founded in 1906 to 
protect young people from the dangerous and exploitive athletics 
practices of the time.”19 This statement, asserting a protective, almost 
parental NCAA, shows a noble organization. While the organization 
came into existence for seemingly important reasons, the statement 
also foreshadows the organization’s modern issues. Before the 
NCAA’s formation, schools wrestled with the same issues we face 
today.20 Competitiveness, commercialization, and the need for safety 
mechanisms plagued college sports. “[T]he commercialization and 
propensity to seek unfair advantages existed virtually from the 
beginning of organized intercollegiate athletics in the United States. 
The problem of cheating, which was no doubt compounded by the 
increasing commercialization of sport, was a matter of concern.”21 
The association was created during a dark time for college 
football as they faced abolition.22 During the 1905 season, eighteen 
amateur players died during games, causing public outcry for the 
implementation of safety procedures.23 Luckily for the sport, then-
President Theodore Roosevelt called together meetings at the White 
House to enact safety reform.24 This movement would morph into the 
NCAA, and later a multi-billion-dollar industry.25 It resulted in an 
organization intent on keeping young athletes safe with a heavy hand 
of control.26 Now, the NCAA does anything but protect students, and 
California lawmakers are looking towards a new reality with SB 206. 
 




 20. Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role 
in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 11 (2000). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 12. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Janie Harris, President’s Day: A Look at U.S. Presidents in College Sports, NCAA 
(Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2017-02-20/presidents-day-look-us-
presidents-college-sports. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See What Is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-
101/what-ncaa (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
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Today, the NCAA acts as a private, nonprofit, unincorporated 
association with 1,1000 member institutions separated into three 
divisions (Division I, Division II, and Division III).27 The association 
votes on new rules and regulations drafted yearly.28 The NCAA 
“prides itself on promotion of collegiate athletics and has a primary 
goal of promoting amateurism.”29 This association was created on 
what some may think are noble values, with an idea of upholding sport 
and competition in a safe environment. But the present-day NCAA 
and athletic world is still dealing with the initial problem plaguing its 
conception: exploitation.30 
This generational issue of the exploitation of athletes is 
compounded by the big business of sports. To clarify, sports has 
become a “big business” in its profitable expertise and its economic 
make-up.31 The NCAA and its university affiliates are essentially an 
“economic group consisting of large profit-making corporations.”32 
They exert power and influence over social and political policy. 
According to the association’s audited financial statement, the 
NCAA had close to $1.1 billion in annual revenue during its 2017 
fiscal year.33 Seventy-five percent of the NCAA’s annual revenue, 
nearly one billion dollars, comes from March Madness.34 “In 2010[,] 
the NCAA signed a fourteen-year, $10.8 billion contract with CBS 
Sports and Turner Broadcasting. . . . The deal was extended in April 
2016 for . . . [an additional] $8.8 billion that will keep the tournament 
on the[] networks until 2032.”35 Approximately 96 percent of the 
 
 27. See Our Three Divisions, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 28. Zachary Bock, Student-Athletes as Employees: Unmasking Athletic Scholarships, 36 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 131, 136–37 (2016). 
 29. Id. at 137. 
 30.  See Schwarz, supra note 6. 
 31. Big Business, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
big%20business (last updated Jan. 7, 2021) (“[A]n economic group consisting of large profit-
making corporations especially with regard to their influence on social or political policy.”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Cameron, supra note 1. 
 34. Id.; Darren Rovell, NCAA Tops $1 Billion in Revenue During 2016–17 School Year, ESPN 
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/22678988/ncaa-tops-1-billion-
revenue-first. 
 35. Jim Smith, March Madness: An “Experiential Commodity” with Money for the Men, Only 
Fame for the Women, and an Illusion for the Fans, HUM. SCI. INST. (Mar. 24, 2019), 
https://humanscienceinstitute.org/blog/march-madness-an-experiential-commodity-with-money-
for-the-men-only-fame-for-the-women-and-an-illusion-for-the-fans/; Rodger Sherman, The 
NCAA’s New March Madness TV Deal Will Make Them a Billion Dollars a Year, SBNATION 
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money the NCAA collects flows to the Division I membership 
immediately.36 “It’s the only system in place that assigns a monetary 
value based on athletic performance”; despite that, none of the money 
is paid to the athletes participating.37 
Additionally, “NCAA executives profit greatly” as “the President 
of the NCAA reportedly made $1.9 million in 2014, and a number of 
other NCAA executives reportedly made over $4 million each.”38 
These exuberant numbers “would not arise without the labor provided 
by college athletes.”39 
This notion of collecting billions of dollars from Division I 
membership and reallocating it to sources irrelevant to such members 
is a policy cornerstone driving SB 206. The NCAA sees massive 
profits, while the young students driving such profits receive 
compensation only in the form of college scholarship. 
B.  Amateurism 
The NCAA protects and upholds an ideal that separates the 
college athlete from that of a professional: amateurism. The hotly 
debated notion is the basis for how student athletes are regulated and 
educated.  
The NCAA provides a platform for member institutions to 
design their athletic programs to be an integral part of the 
educational program. Further, the NCAA establishes that it 
is necessary to have a clear line of demarcation between 
college athletes and professional sports in order to preserve 
the student in the student-athlete.40 
At its roots, amateurism was created to protect young, 
unprofessional athletes.41 However, politicians and athletes debate that 
while noble and necessary, its practices no longer accomplish such 
 
(Apr. 12, 2016, 5:06 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2016/4/12/11415764/ 
ncaa-tournament-tv-broadcast-rights-money-payout-cbs-turner. 
 36. Tim Parker, How Much Does the NCAA Make off March Madness?, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/031516/how-much-does-ncaa-
make-march-madness.asp; Finances of Intercollegiate Athletics, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/ab 
out/resources/research/finances-intercollegiate-athletics (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 37. Parker, supra note 36. 
 38. Grenardo, supra note 16, at 237. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Bock, supra note 28, at 159. 
 41. Sheetz, supra note 2, at 871. 
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goals.42 “The Oxford English Dictionary defines amateur as ‘one who 
cultivates anything as a pastime, as distinguished from one who 
prosecutes it professionally.’”43 
The Olympics were once an amateur event, wholly dedicated to 
the idea of “no-pay-for-play,” as today’s NCAA. Many historians 
theorize amateurism was intended to keep poor classes from 
interfering with wealthy sportsmanship.44 “Sports historian Allen 
Guttmann explains that in its earliest institution, rules of amateurism 
were invented by the Victorian middle and upper classes to exclude 
the ‘lower orders’ from the play of the leisure class.”45 “Classism ruled 
the sports and athletic activities practiced by the gentry, not only to 
prevent the mingling of the higher echelons with the common masses, 
but because many of the elite insisted that the ‘plebeians’ had no 
concept of sportsmanship and fair play.”46 The classic notion of 
amateurism is deeply rooted in limiting participation to those “who 
did not receive any financial compensation for his or her athletic 
endeavors.”47 The conglomeration of personal wealth kept amateurism 
alive.48 This begs the question: How is a system, deeply rooted in 
wealth discrimination, alive and well today? 
The answer to that question is found in the world of college 
athletes. Centuries later, financially poor athletes are prohibited from 
earning wealth off their talent. The Olympics remedied this issue in 
1960 when the International Olympic Committee pushed to include 
professional athletes in the game.49 Critics believed that including 
professional athletes would sink the entirety of the Olympic games.50 
Simply, society proffered the end of amateurism as the end of 
competitive spirit and Olympic viewership. Somehow, critics equated 
amateurism with Olympic viewership and sportsmanship. 
 
 42. See id. at 873. 
 43. L.A. Jennings, For Love or for Money: A History of Amateurism in the Olympic Games, 
VICE (June 7, 2016, 11:25 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/gvaqdm/for-love-or-for-money-
a-history-of-amateurism-in-the-olympic-games. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Patrick Hruby, The Olympics Show Why College Sports Should Give Up on 
Amateurism, ATLANTIC (July 25, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/
07/the-olympics-show-why-college-sports-should-give-up-on-amateurism/260275/. 
 50. Id. 
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Even Avery Brundage, the International Olympic Committee 
president from 1952–1972 and a staunch supporter of preserving 
amateurism in the Olympics, said in 1955: “We can only rely on the 
support of those who believe in the principles of fair play and 
sportsmanship embodied in the amateur code in our efforts to prevent 
the games from being used by individuals, organizations or nations for 
ulterior motives.”51 
Despite the critics, the exact opposite occurred, and the naysayers 
were silenced as viewership increased and the masses gathered to 
watch sport.52 There was an “influx of individual trust funds to help 
support amateur athlete competitors in non-traditional sports such as 
skiing. It opened the door for runners and others to accept prize 
money, sponsorships and endorsements to fund their training.”53 
Athletes earned money, while viewers tuned in at much higher rates 
to watch their favorite professionals.54 It even led to incredibly 
“impactful sports moments and teams, such as the fabled USA’s men’s 
basketball ‘Dream Team’ in 1992.”55 
C.  Scholarships and the Life of Athletes 
1.  The Guise of an NCAA Scholarship 
Student athlete scholarships are the bread and butter to the NCAA 
and its associated universities’ promotion of amateurism. According 
to the NCAA, full grant-in-aid or scholarships is “financial aid that 
consists of tuition and fees, room and board, books, and other expenses 
related to attendance at the institution up to the cost of attendance” set 
to a limit by the association.56 On the surface, a student-athlete 
scholarship provides aid and opportunity to those who have honed 
their sport to a collegiate level. A simple look at the NCAA’s 
description of scholarship reveals a seemingly altruistic and beneficial 
practice. They boast: 
 
 51. Ross Andrews, Push to Allow Professional Athletes Took Hold in 1968 Olympic Games, 
GLOB. SPORT MATTERS (Oct. 15, 2018), https://globalsportmatters.com/mexico/2018/10/15/profe
ssional-athletes-1968-olympic-games. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Bock, supra note 28, at 140. 
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NCAA Divisions I and II schools provide more than $3.6 
billion in athletics scholarships annually to more than 
180,000 student-athletes. . . . Full scholarships cover tuition 
and fees, room, board and course-related books. Most 
student-athletes who receive athletics scholarships receive an 
amount covering a portion of these costs. Many student-
athletes also benefit from academic scholarships, NCAA 
financial aid programs such as the NCAA Division I Student-
Athlete Opportunity Fund and need-based aid such as 
Federal Pell Grants.57 
Other entities describe scholarships similarly. Most common, 
definitions circle around the idea of helping student-athletes. 
Merriam-Webster’s Learner’s Dictionary defines scholarship as “an 
amount of money that is given by a school, an organization, etc., to a 
student to help pay for the student’s education.”58 The Oxford 
Dictionary defines scholarship as “a grant or payment made to support 
a student’s education, awarded on the basis of academic or other 
achievement.”59 Moreover, the Cambridge Dictionary defines 
scholarship as “an amount of money given by a school, college, 
university, or other organization to pay for the studies of a person with 
great ability but little money.”60 
These definitions and the NCAA promote a “a college education” 
above wealth acquisition and sport.61 It is purported to be “the most 
rewarding benefit of the student-athlete experience.”62 The ideals 
behind this notion are obvious: scholarships intend to benefit a student 
“(whether an undergraduate or a graduate) at an educational institution 
to aid in the pursuit of his or her studies.”63 
Notably, a large amount of NCAA “distributions are made based 
on athletic success; they are not typically provided based on 
 
 57. Scholarships, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/scholarships (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 58. Scholarship, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.learnersdict 
ionary.com/definition/scholarship (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 59. Scholarship, OXFORD DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/ 
american_english/scholarship (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 60. Scholarship, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/ 
english/scholarship (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 61. See Scholarships, supra note 57. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Publication 970 (2019), Tax Benefits for Education, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/ 
publications/p970/ch01.html (last updated Jan. 22, 2020). 
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graduation rates or on academic performance of the schools and their 
athletes. This seems counterintuitive given the NCAA’s purported 
primary goal of education for its athletes.”64 If this weren’t enough to 
show the NCAA’s and affiliate universities’ disinterest with academic 
support, games are frequently on weekdays, a seemingly 
counterproductive notion if universities want their students to attend 
class prepared.65 
By definition, athletes should be receiving fair compensation in 
the form of education. But, in reality, we find that students are often 
left desolate, their talent and energy wasted on four grueling years. 
During these four years, high-level athletes receive very little 
education and absolutely no profit. 
2.  The Life of a College Athlete 
The above section outlined factual examples of what a student-
athlete scholarship is intended to accomplish. By definition, the 
studies of a college athlete come first, and their educational 
“compensation” would provide them with the means to adequately 
live and learn. This means that academic compensation fairly provides 
for the requisite athletic performance given by these athletes to their 
schools. Scholarships are considered payment for such performance.66 
However, the pursuit of academia while under scholarship does not 
always play out as intended. This section highlights the oxymoron of 
athletic compensation. Many students receive an academic scholarship 
that provides them with very little time for academics and very few 
resources to pursue academics.67 
The root problem behind athletic compensation is highlighted by 
both the lifestyle of a collegiate athlete and the monetary value behind 
their play. Students on collegiate teams must remain amateurs, 
prohibited from receiving outside compensation for their athleticism.68 
This poses a huge issue for every type of Division I athlete, those with 
and without full scholarships. 
Young, aspiring athletes typically fantasize about joining the 
ranks of these collegiate athletes. Scholarship opportunities are the 
 
 64. Grenardo, supra note 16. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See infra Section III.B, on how this has changed due to SB 206. 
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goal for many. However, the glamorous façade circling college 
student-athletes is starkly different from the reality.69 Issues quickly 
arise as the cost of living exceeds expectations, schoolwork overloads, 
and work opportunities are absent.70 Nicole Sung-Jereczek, a 
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) rower spoke out 
regarding the formidable commitment of college sports.71 She said that 
she “didn’t expect or anticipate the amount of time that [she] would 
have to devote to it”72 and was shocked on the limits her commitment 
imposed.73 She was not able to get a part-time job or internship.74 
Sung-Jereczak’s issue with college sports is just the tip of the iceberg 
and does not represent a minority.75 
An “NCAA survey found that a typical NCAA athlete in-season 
spends 39 hours a week on academics—and 33 hours a week on 
sports.”76 Many student athletes describe their time representing a 
university as all-consuming.77 The numbers circling the life of a 
college athlete take ambiguity away from the problem of amateurism. 
In fact, they highlight exactly why it is a failing system. 
Roughly “70,000 student-athletes . . . attend[] a university or 
college without paying for the cost of attendance. Still, the NCAA 
reported that there was approximately 173,500 student-athletes that 
participated in Division I athletics.”78 That totals an “astonishing 
103,500 student-athletes who . . . pay[] . . . a portion of their [tuition] 
at an NCAA member institution.”79 This number should surprise 
many, as these students must pay the incredibly high cost of 
attendance, while unable to make money. In a 2015 study, the average 
annual cost of attendance (not including personal costs or 
transportation) for a full-time enrollment at a four-year degree 
institution was $34,031 out-of-state and $19,548 in-state.80 That 
 
 69. See Kelley Holland, Think Athletic Scholarships Are a ‘Holy Grail’? Think Again, CNBC 
(Oct. 13, 2014, 6:02 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/10/13/think-athletic-scholarships-are-a-
holy-grail-think-again.html. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Bock, supra note 28, at 142. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 144 (including the cost of “tuition, fees, and room and board”). 
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means that 103,500 students are paying tens of thousands of dollars to 
essentially work full time at universities. 
Even those who receive a full-scholarship for tuition, room, 
board, and books must pay “generally between $2000 and $5000 per 
year more than the value of respective school’s athletic scholarship.”81 
The full cost of attendance fees “include[] a tuition fee, miscellaneous 
personal expenses, transportation, loan origination fee and 
administrative fees.”82 These extra fees can be so crippling to students 
that they go hungry. For example, in 2014, a basketball player from 
Connecticut told the media that he often went to bed hungry.83 
In actuality, a total of seventy-two hours dedicated to sports and 
practice is well over a full-time job. One might ask: Why would an 
eighteen-year-old dedicate such extreme hours? If the answer is to 
obtain a scholarship to play at a university, the numbers do not 
correlate with the time commitment. 
III.  EXISTING LAW 
Recently, critics of amateurism have gained attention, prevailing 
in a decades long fight within the California legislature. SB 206 passed 
in California, giving student-athletes the right to profit on their name 
and likeness.84 This bill starkly contrasts with the pre-existing 
landscape of college sports, disallowing any monetary gain for 
collegiate athletes. Despite the groundbreaking nature of this bill, 
steep impediments remain to the financial freedom of student-athletes. 
This section details California employment law, relevant Ninth Circuit 
cases, and the details of SB 206, the Fair Pay to Play Act. 
A.  Employment Law 
To decide if someone is an employee, common law applies a 
“right to control” test, which asks whether the person to whom service 
is rendered has the “right to control the manner and means of 
accomplishing the result desire.”85 Additionally, courts consider nine 
factors when deciding whether an individual is an employee in the 
eyes of the law: (1) “right to discharge at will, without cause”; (2) 
 
 81. Grenardo, supra note 16, at 244. 
 82. Id. (alteration in original). 
 83. Id. at 228. 
 84. See S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 85. S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989). 
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“whether the one performing [the] services is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business”; (3) “the kind of occupation, with reference to 
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction 
of the principal or by a specialist without supervision”; (4) “the skill 
required in the particular occupation”; (5) “whether the principal or 
the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work 
for the person doing the work”; (6) “the length of time for which the 
services are to be performed”; (7) “method of payment, whether by 
the time or by the job”; (8) “whether” or not the work is part of the 
regular business of the principal”; and (9) “whether or not the parties 
believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.”86 
These individual factors “cannot be applied mechanically as separate 
tests; they are intertwined and their weight depends often on particular 
combinations.”87 However, this test does not apply when determining 
employment status for the purpose of compliance with California 
wage orders.88 
In California, the plain language of the California Labor Code 
§ 3351 codifies the test set forth in S.G. Borello & Sons v. Department 
of Industrial Relations.89 Section 3351 states that an “‘[e]mployee’ 
means every person in the service of an employer under any 
appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, 
oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.”90 There are 
a number of exceptions to section 3351 of California Labor Code.91 
Of note, California Labor Code § 3352(a)(7) exempts student-athletes 
from this definition of an employee and the corresponding protections 
that come with it.92 California Labor Code § 3352(a)(7) excludes from 
the category of employee, “[a] person . . . participating in sports or 
athletics who does not receive compensation for the participation other 
than the use of athletic equipment, uniforms, transportation, travel, 
meals, lodgings, or other expenses incidental thereto.”93 
This exception is the crux of inequitable treatment for athletes. 
Federal courts have incorrectly failed to apply the meaning of an 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (quoting Germann v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 176 Cal. Rptr. 868, 871 (1981)). 
 88. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 35 (Cal. 2018). 
 89. 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989). 
 90. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
 91. See, e.g., id. § 3352(a)(7). 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. 
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employee to athletes by pin-pointing their behavior under an exception 
to the statute. Yet, the true nature of their activity exactly tracks the 
conduct described in the statute. In reality, an exemption applies to 
uphold amateurism and to keep academic compensation alive. This 
Note dives into the court’s incorrect application, and how SB 206 turns 
this exception on its head. 
B.  SB 206 
Prior to the passing of SB 206, the  
Student Athlete Bill of Rights, require[d] intercollegiate 
athletic programs at [four]-year private universities or 
campuses of the University of California or the California 
State University that receive, as an average, $10,000,000 or 
more in annual revenue derived from media rights for 
intercollegiate athletics to comply with prescribed 
requirements relating to student athlete rights.94  
This Bill of Rights sets forth provisions that ensure coaches are well-
trained in safety and health care, that student athletes have a safe 
playing environment, and that emergency action plans are in place.95 
Such plans and requirements provide that 
California’s Pac-12 colleges, which are flush with new TV 
revenue, . . . provide continuing education for players on 
teams with graduation rates below 60%, pay for sports-
related medical expenses, cover medical coverage premiums 
for low income student-athletes, improve workout safety to 
avoid preventable deaths, provide financial and life skills 
workshops, and guarantee student-athletes the same due 
process rights that are given to regular students.96 
The Bill of Rights states that post-secondary student-athletes have 
the right to “receive an equivalent scholarship” from the university if 
they lose their athletic scholarship due to injury, attend a “financial 
and life skills workshop” in their first and third years, and have “the 
 
 94. S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 95. See California Governor Signs NCPA Student-Athletes Bill of Rights!, NAT’L COLL. 
PLAYERS ASS’N (Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.ncpanow.org/news/releases-advisories/california-
governor-signs-ncpa-student-athletes-bill-of-rights. 
 96. Id. 
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same rights as other students with regard to any and all matters related 
to possible adverse or disciplinary actions.”97 
UCLA football players submitted a signed letter of support for SB 
1525.98 UCLA football player Jeff Locke stated, 
The passing of the California Student-Athletes Bill of Rights 
into law is a huge step in the right direction for securing basic 
protections for college athletes in California. Along with the 
work of Senator Padilla, his staff, and the NCPA, support 
among current student-athletes at UCLA was key to gaining 
support for this bill. I hope that college athletes and 
lawmakers in other states become aware of the protections 
that were secured for student-athletes by this bill, and they 
take the steps necessary to get a similar bill passed in their 
state.99 
While these protections go far to protect basic rights of students, 
Californians did not think they went far enough. The existing law 
failed to account for the exuberant profit of schools off of their athletes 
and the corresponding monetary needs of these athletes. The law 
helped to keep athletes physically healthy and guarantee them basic 
rights. But it barely touched on most basic rights, leaving athletes 
without the means to provide for themselves. Simply, “NCAA rules 
strictly prohibit athletes from profiting in any way from their 
sports.”100 
In February of 2019, California state senators Nancy Skinny and 
Steven Bradford took on a question that has so obviously plagued 
sports for decades. Skinny and Bradford “unveiled SB 206,” which 
was aimed “to aid the majority of full-scholarship college athletes, 
lift[] them out of poverty, provide support in managing academic 
course load[,] and incentiviz[e] student-athletes to complete their 
 
 97. S.B. 1525, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67452 
(Deering 2021)). 
 98. See California Governor Signs NCPA Student-Athletes Bill of Rights!, supra note 95. 
 99. Id. 
 100. A Quick Snapshot of 3 Things that California SB 206 Does, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019, 
9:18 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-30/la-me-college-athletes-pay-sb-
206-newsom-text-bill. 
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undergraduate degrees before transitioning to professional 
leagues.”101 SB 206 is also known as The Fair Pay to Play Act.102 
The support for The Fair Pay to Play Act skyrocketed as it gained 
massive social media attention.103 The Act garnered bipartisan support 
and was approved in the California Senate on a thirty-one to four 
vote.104 Later, the Act was “unanimously approved by the state 
Assembly by a 72-0 vote.”105 
The landmark bill “will prohibit the NCAA from barring a 
university from competition if its athletes are compensated for the use 
of their name, image or likeness beginning in 2023.”106 The legislature 
wrote: 
[SB 206 prohibits] California postsecondary educational 
institutions except community colleges, and every athletic 
association, conference, or other group or organization with 
authority over intercollegiate athletics, from providing a 
prospective intercollegiate student athlete with compensation 
in relation to the athlete’s name, image, or likeness, or 
preventing a student participating in intercollegiate athletics 
from earning compensation as a result of the use of the 
student’s name, image, or likeness or obtaining professional 
representation relating to the student’s participation in 
intercollegiate athletics.107 
In addition to allowing student-athletes to control and the ability 
to gain revenue for their own name, likeness, and image, the bill allows 
professional representation for student athletes. This representation, 
often an agent or lawyer, must be “from persons licensed by the 
 
 101. Veronica Fernandez De Soto, A Breakdown of SB 206, Which Allows Student-Athletes to 
Monetize Their Likenesses, DAILY BRUIN: THE QUAD (Oct. 16, 2019, 6:25 PM), 
https://dailybruin.com/2019/10/16/the-quad-a-breakdown-of-sb-206-which-allows-student-
athletes-to-monetize-their-likenesses; Press Release, Nancy Skinner, State Senator of California, 
Senator Nancy Skinner Announces “The Fair Pay to Play Act” (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://sd09.senate.ca.gov/news/20190205-senator-nancy-skinner-announces-“-fair-pay-play-act”. 
 102. LeBron Rallies Support for Fair Pay to Play Bill, ESPN (Sept. 5, 2019), 
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27543413/lebron-rallies-support-fair-pay-play-
bill. 
 103. Id. (referencing a tweet from LeBron James advocating for SB 206 that received over 
100,000 likes). 
 104. Fernandez De Soto, supra note 101. 
 105. Id. 
 106. A Quick Snapshot of 3 Things That California SB 206 Does, supra note 100. 
 107. S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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state.”108 Athletic agents must comply with federal law when working 
with student athletes. 
Further, SB 206 prohibits post-secondary schools from revoking 
a student’s athletic scholarship as a result of him or her earning 
compensation or obtaining legal representation. Nevertheless, the bill 
prohibits a student athlete from entering into compensation contracts 
that include provisions that are in conflict with any provision of the 
athlete’s team contract.109 Additionally, the bill provides that a team 
contract cannot prevent the commercialized purpose of a student 
athlete’s name, image, or likeness when they are not engaged in 
official team activities.110 
When SB 206 becomes operative, a student’s scholarship cannot 
be revoked because they choose to seek compensation for use of their 
name, image, or likeness. However, a student-athlete will be 
prohibited from receiving compensation if their contract for 
compensation conflicts with a provision of an athlete’s contract with 
the athletic team. In accordance with the legislative purpose of the bill, 
SB 206 states that a team contract cannot prevent a student athlete 
from receiving compensation for their name, image, or likeness for a 
commercial activity unrelated to official team activities.111 
SB 206 and its provisions become operative on January 1, 2023 
for California student-athletes.112 The bill requires “the Chancellor of 
the California Community Colleges to convene a community college 
athlete name, image, and likeness working group composed of 
individuals appointed on or before July 1, 2020.”113 Additionally, this 
working group must  
review various athletic association bylaws and state and 
federal laws regarding a college athlete’s use of the athlete’s 
name, image, and likeness for compensation . . . [and] 
submit to the Legislature and the California Community 
College Athletic Association a report containing its findings 
and policy recommendations in connection with this 
review114 
 
 108. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456(c)(2) (Deering 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023). 
 109. Id. § 67456(e)(1). 
 110. Id. § 67456(f). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. § 67456. 
 113. S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 114. Id. 
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SB 206 represents a massive shift in California public policy from 
strict amateurism to a sort of gray area, calling for a fairer, 
compensated athletic environment. This gray area surfaces as the 
oxymoron of a student-athlete is brought to light: they are not 
considered employees but now have the opportunity to make money 
in a small sector of their livelihood. The exploitation by schools 
remains, but now student-athletes can find compensation from outside 
their university. Additionally, this gray area rears its head when prior 
case law is highlighted. This bill, in essence, supersedes prior case law 
that affirmed the nonexistent rights of collegiate athletes. This bill 
turns our understanding of traditional amateurism on its head, shifting 
California public policy. In turn, the courts must shift their rulings and 
develop a new outlook on past California cases. 
C.  Case Law 
Case law surrounding the issue of student-athlete compensation 
is sparse but insightful as to public policy before SB 206 was enacted. 
According to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the NCAA is a regulatory 
body and does not act as an employer within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203. In Dawson v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,115 the 
court held that the former college football player failed to state a claim 
for relief against the NCAA or the conference for violations of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).116 The court relied on the “California 
Legislature’s decision to except student-athletes from workers 
compensation benefits and decisions of the California Courts of 
Appeal that interpret the student-athlete exception.”117 
The Dawson plaintiff had very little room for argument as 
California law, prior to Senate Bill 2076, was fairly specific as to the 
role of employers in collegiate athletics.118 They upheld the district 
court, finding that the Division I college football player was not an 
employee of the NCAA and the PAC-12 Conference within the 
meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), because “the NCAA and 
PAC-12 were regulatory bodies, not employers, of student-athletes 
under the FLSA,” as NCAA regulations limiting scholarships did not 
create any expectation of compensation, neither the NCAA nor the 
 
115.  932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 116. Id. at 912. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 911. 
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PAC-12 had the power to fire or hire the player, and there was no 
evidence that the NCAA rules were conceived or carried out to evade 
the law, and further, the revenue generated by college sports did not 
convert the relationship between student-athletes and the NCAA into 
an employment relationship.119 Additionally, “[t]he player’s 
California law claims were properly dismissed because under the 
California Labor Code, student-athletes were not employees of the 
NCAA/PAC-12.”120 
This inability to bring a lawsuit for employee status within the 
Ninth Circuit inhibits the rights of student athletes. Recently, in Berger 
v. NCAA,121 a former soccer player Samantha Sackos filed a complaint 
against the NCAA and its member schools alleging violations of the 
FLSA because the NCAA failed to pay college athletes for hours 
worked while practicing and playing college sports.122 Though this 
case was heard in the Southern District of Indiana, it gives insight as 
to the possibility of allowing standing for student-athletes.123 
Following holdings of courts nationwide, the Berger court held that 
the student-athletes failed to state a claim because student athletes are 
not employees according to the law.124 Additionally, the court found 
that the student-athletes did not have standing to sue the NCAA, but 
they did have standing to sue the individual university in question.125  
The court noted that the “students at Penn who choose to 
participate in sports—whether NCAA sports, club sports, or 
intramural sports—as part of their educational experience do 
so because they view it as beneficial to them,” and that “the 
existence of thousands of unpaid college athletes on college 
campuses each year is not a secret and yet the Department of 
Labor has not taken any action to apply the FLSA to them.” 
As a result[,] the court found that “the fact that the Plaintiffs 
 
 119. Id. at 909–11. 
 120. MICHAEL J. KILLEEN, EMPLOYMENT IN WASHINGTON: A GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAWS, 
REGULATIONS, AND PRACTICES § 8-3[a] (4th ed. 2020). 
121. 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 122. Id. at 289; Adam Epstein & Paul M. Anderson, The Relationship Between a Collegiate 
Student-Athlete and the University: An Historical and Legal Perspective, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. 
REV. 287, 296–97 (2016) (explaining that Samantha Sackos initiated the lawsuit but withdrew from 
the case, making Gillian Berger, Lauren Anderson, and Taylor Hennig the new named plaintiffs). 
 123. See Berger, 843 F.3d at 289. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
(13) 54.3_ROSENBLUM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/13/21  7:46 PM 
1004 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:985 
participate in an NCAA athletic team at Penn does not make 
them employees of Penn for FLSA purposes.”126 
This reasoning is one that is also shared by the California Courts. 
There is no way to uphold amateurism if we deem student-athletes as 
employees. However, as will be later detailed, this is an outdated way 
of classification, expressly tied to a dying principle SB 206 overrules. 
SB 206 could represent a legislative change in policy that may 
proliferate future remedies for this California hurdle. 
Similar issues in the courts are impacted by SB 206. In 2009, 
athletes garnered a modest victory in response to the NCAA’s 
“unwillingness to share revenue with . . . student-athlete[s].”127 This 
case does not directly concern the FLSA, but it alludes to the impact 
by SB 206 and payment to student-athletes. 
In that 2009 case, Ed O’Bannon, a former basketball player, 
found a digital version of himself on a video game and sued the 
NCAA.128 O’Bannon never received compensation for the video game 
representation and argued in his lawsuit that the NCAA violated 
federal antitrust law by not allowing student-athletes to profit from 
their likeness in broadcasts and video games.129 
The California district court ruled that the NCAA violated the 
Sherman Act by “not allowing the student-athletes to share in the 
revenue generated from their names, images, and likenesses.”130 
However, the ruling was partially overturned on appeal as the Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the Sherman Act violation but found issue with 
athletic compensation. This notion of payment, and a lack thereof, is 
what keeps student-athletes amateurs.  
The Ninth Circuit echoed the Supreme Court’s language that 
it “must afford the NCAA ‘ample latitude’ to superintend 
college athletics.” Moreover, the Ninth Circuit reveled on the 
importance of amateurism in NCAA history and found there 
to be a quantum leap between offering student-athletes 
education-related compensation and offering deferred cash 
 
 126. Epstein & Anderson, supra note 122, at 297 (quoting Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 162 F. Supp. 3d 845, 857 (S.D. Ind. 2016)). 
 127. Bock, supra note 28, at 161. 
 128. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 
2014), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 129. Id. at 963. 
 130. Bock, supra note 28, at 161 (citing O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007). 
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payments that were not, in any way, connected to educational 
expenses.131  
This ruling theorizes there would be “no basis for returning to a 
rule of amateurism and no defined stopping point,” if the NCAA 
paid athletes for expenses unrelated to their academic pursuits.132 
The key in this case was the difference between sport and 
education-related compensation and offering deferred cash payments 
that are unconnected to educational expenses. As a result of this ruling, 
NCAA member schools are now allowed to offer stipends to cover the 
full cost of attendance.133 However, that number “is capped at $500 a 
month, which some argue is a meager sum.”134 
Courts outside of California have ruled on the workers 
compensation as related to athletics. The California courts are not the 
only court to rule in favor of upholding amateurism despite the 
difficulties student athletes at top schools face. Three other well-
known and more recent football related decisions from Michigan, 
Indiana, and Texas secure that student-athletes were not entitled to 
worker’s compensation.  
In Rensing, the Indiana Supreme Court found no evidence of 
an employer-employee relationship. In Coleman, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals opined that there was no 
employment contract between the university and the student-
athlete. Finally, in Waldrep, the Texas Court of Appeals 
emphasized that there . . . was no intent on the part of Texas 
Christian University (TCU) or football player Kent Waldrep 
that his scholarship should constitute payment for his football 
services, thereby not creating an employer-employee 
relationship that would fall under worker’s compensation 
statutes.135 
These cases represent a line of thought paralleling a pre-SB 206 
landscape. The court essentially feared a world without amateurism, 
 
 131. Id. at 161–62. 
 132. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 133. Mario Koran, ‘Game Changer’: Inside the Fight to End Exploitation of Athletes at US 
Colleges, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2019 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2019/oct/
04/ncaa-california-law-pay-student-athletes-colleges. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Epstein & Anderson, supra note 122, at 294; Rensing v. Ind. St. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 
N.E. 2d 1170 (Ind. 1983); Coleman v. Western Mich. Univ., 336 N.W. 2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1983); Waldrep v. Tex. Emps. Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000). 
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as those did prior to the 1960 Olympic Conferences. All of these cases 
stem from a time before SB 206. The bill represents a drastic shift from 
case law that obviously overrides the past California case law 
inhibiting student athletic compensation for their name and likeness. 
The bill takes a large step in allowing third parties to pay athletes; 
however, it is silent on the NCAA and member schools payment in 
situations similar to Dawson and O’Bannon. 
IV.  CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW: THREE ISSUES PLAGUE CALIFORNIA 
LABOR LAW IN A FAIR PAY TO PLAY ERA 
California Labor Law and its underlying dependence on 
amateurism faces many issues with the passing of SB 206. This Note 
highlights three problems among many: (1) the current California 
labor exception for athletes directly contradicts public policy behind 
SB 206, and additionally, highlights why student athletes meet a 
common law definition of employees; (2) the promotion of 
amateurism is outdated and does not align with the actual life of 
Division I student athletes; and (3) most student athletes do not have 
the ability to play professional sports, thus the NCAA takes away their 
only opportunity to capitalize on their own publicity. 
A.  SB 206 Public Policy Directly Contradicts California Labor Law 
and a True Analysis of the “Right to Control” Test for Student 
Athletes 
This issue is two-fold. First, SB 206 dramatically changed the 
landscape for student-athletes.136 It did not simply give them publicity 
rights independent from their university, but it additionally proves 
Californians do not believe in the age-old adage of amateurism.137 
This policy shift, from strict amateurism to compensation, requires 
California legislators and courts to take a new look at section 
3352(a)(7) of the California Labor Law.138 SB 206 establishes new 
policy ideals rendering the existing employment law exception for 
 
 136. See generally S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (SB 206 changes the 
environment for college athletes in 2023 as the first opportunity they have had to receive 
compensation). 
 137. Michael McCann, Could ‘Fair Pay to Play Act’ Pave Way Toward End of Amateurism in 
Collegiate Athletics?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 25, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/ 
05/25/california-fair-pay-play-act-end-ncaa-amateurism. 
 138. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(a)(7) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
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college athletes as outdated and plainly unfair. It directly contradicts 
with our existing view of amateurism.139 
This passing of SB 206 made apparent: Californians believe 
athletes deserve more. This idea of athletics evolving from traditional 
amateurism follows the same storyline as the 1960 Olympics. 
Legislatures no longer believe there should be a hard and fast line 
restricting payment for student-athletes. The California Labor Code 
exception for athletes follows old ideals that now represent unfair 
treatment.140 
Second, these same policy concerns that necessitate the court to 
reevaluate the Labor Laws also necessitate a reevaluation of the 
definition of an employee under common law. The “right of control” 
test would ask whether the universities have the right to control the 
manner and means of their athletic teams.141 The answer is an 
overwhelming yes. The universities hand-pick every detail of their 
athlete’s life. Everything from their schedule, clothes, food, payment, 
strength, training, coaches, tutors, classes, living arrangement, 
equipment, breaks, and sick days are controlled by the university.142 
Under common law, there should be no question an arrangement such 
as this qualifies as employment. 
B.  The Outdated Promotion of Amateurism Does Not Align with the 
Life of Student Athletes 
The life of a student athlete differs greatly from their non-athletic 
peers. In reality, many student-athletes have analogized themselves as 
slaves to their schools. Seen within their extreme hours, poor 
educational compensation, and difficulty staying afloat while 
balancing such a lifestyle, amateurism is failing students.143 
Most Division I (DI) athletes work extreme hours, much longer 
than most employees. It is not uncommon for an athlete to spend well 
over forty hours a week training and up to eighty hours.144 Further, 
 
 139. See generally Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/amateuri 
sm (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (explaining different situations which might affect a college athlete’s 
amateur status). 
 140. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(a)(7). 
 141. See Brassinga v. City of Mountain View, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 672 (1998). 
 142. Bock, supra note 28, at 137; NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETE ASS’N, GOALS STUDY OF 
THE STUDENT ATHLETE EXPERIENCE INITIAL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 2–5 (2016), 
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/GOALS_2015_summary_jan2016_final_20160627.pdf. 
 143. See Bock, supra note 28, at 162. 
 144. Id. at 158 n.167; see Holland, supra note 69. 
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these long hours are not rewarded with adequate educational 
compensation. Athletes frequently miss class for sporting events and 
travel. They are not allowed to attend classes that conflict with their 
season games and trainings and are additionally left with very little 
time after practice to learn new material. It is a known phenomenon 
that athletes are put in easier classes so they can get passing grades 
with their busy schedules. They are forced to miss most holidays and 
family events. For example, most DI Women’s Basketball players do 
not get Thanksgiving breaks like the rest of their peers as they must 
play in tournaments.145 
It is obvious that amateurism is no longer doing its job. Students 
are exploited daily. They work grueling hours but receive no 
compensation. SB 206 gives them some means to remedy this 
exploitation. It allows athletes to make additional money from outside 
sources. This will be the first time they have the ability to buy food, 
clothes, and necessities outside of what the school supplies. However, 
the bill does nothing to remedy the true offenders of student 
exploitation. 
The universities are the true offenders. They have left students in 
an unfair position. Millions of videos, pictures, and advertisements are 
sent out to the world using the likeness of college athletes. The NCAA 
and universities make substantial revenue off this media. SB 206 only 
addresses the name and likeness from outside sources. While the 
universities get rich, the athletes get a subpar education for their hard 
work. 
C.  Most Student Athletes Do Not Have the Opportunity to Capitalize 
on Their One Chance for Publicity 
Many proponents for amateurism and the small scope of SB 206 
call on an athlete’s ability to make massive profits after graduation. 
While this is very true for some athletes, it is true for only a small 
fraction of athletes. Fewer than 2 percent of college athletes make 
professional leagues after graduation.146 Thus, for 98 percent of 
 
145.  See, e.g., Mitchell Northam, Viewer’s Guide to Thanksgiving Week in Women’s College 
Basketball, NCAA (Nov. 28, 2019), https://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-women/article/2019-
11-26/viewers-guide-thanksgiving-week-womens-college-basketball.  
 146. Angela Farmer, Let’s Get Real with College Athletes About Their Chances of Going Pro, 
THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 24, 2019, 6:47 AM), https://theconversation.com/lets-get-real-with-
college-athletes-about-their-chances-of-going-pro-110837. 
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college athletes, they have one chance to capitalize on publicity and 
athletics.147 Universities take this chance away. 
V.  PROPOSAL 
The age-old adage of mandatory amateurism does not 
compliment the lifestyle of modern collegiate athletes. SB 206 makes 
a small, important, yet flawed change to the system. Its passing 
represents a massive shift in public policy that must be reflected in 
California law. Where employment law exempts college athletes from 
employment, it simultaneously exempts them from vital labor 
protections.148 
There are numerous, palatable changes to legislation that can help 
protect the mass-exploited collegiate athletes. This Note proposes two. 
First, SB 206 should be expanded to allow universities to pay their 
athletes for their name and likeness. This would provide all levels of 
athletes the ability to support themselves, save, and capitalize on their 
college opportunity. A change such as this would allow both 
universities and athletes to benefit. 
The key to dissuading critics of integrating a salary and publicity 
rights into the life of collegiate athletes rests in election—it would not 
be mandatory. Salary and payment, unless work hours exceeds that of 
their scholarship, would be up to the discretion of the university. This 
dissuades what the Atlantic noted as a main critique of collegiate 
athlete payment: 
Supporters of college sports amateurism often claim that 
scrapping the system would be like giving all Americans 
equal access to health care: a nice idea, but a legal and fiscal 
impossibility. After all, letting student-athletes earn money 
means paying them a market wage. Which in turn means 
axing currently subsidized campus sports like tennis and 
volleyball; fending off inevitable Title IX lawsuits; dealing 
with a probable athlete union; possibly saying goodbye to the 
NCAA’s all-important federal tax-exempt status.149 
The court incorrectly shared a similar view, “the market for 
college football is distinct from other sports markets and must be 
‘differentiate[d]’ from professional sports lest it become ‘minor league 
 
 147. See id. 
 148. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(a)(7) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
 149. Hruby, supra note 49. 
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[football].’”150 What critics fail to see is that amateurism has already 
failed. It has failed to such a degree that universities are the ones now 
exploiting their athletes. Fixing this flaw would not create more 
“minors” as the court proffered, but it would enable the collegiality 
and protection of students. 
The Olympics doesn’t pay participants. It simply allows 
them to get paid. There’s a difference. A difference college 
sports should welcome with open arms. . . . [L]et [college 
athletes] be like Phelps, appearing in commercials and on the 
cover of video games, profiting off their fame and image like 
everyone else in America. Including their coaches. Doing so 
won’t cost the current college sports industrial complex a 
penny of the billions it receives for men’s football and 
basketball broadcast rights; if anything, it will help grow and 
share the wealth without having to share too much of said 
wealth. [Caitlyn] Jenner’s iconic paid appearance on a 
Wheaties box was good for the former decathlete and good 
for [her] sport; if Brundage’s ghost shed a single Iron Eyes 
Cody tear at the rank commercialism of it all, well, boo-hoo. 
“Players already endorse products. . . . They already serve as 
billboards for the shoe companies. They’re used in video 
games. They’re used in lots of way. Schools have fundraisers 
where they sign autographs and gear on behalf of the 
school.”151 
An expansion of SB 206 would simply allow students to reap the 
fruits of their labor for activities in which they already participate. 
Second, the California Labor Code should simultaneously be 
amended to provide student-athletes with the protections of 
employees. This does not mean to completely make collegiate athletes 
the employees of their universities, but it does require they receive 
some benefit for dedicating their time and energy in a manner similar 
to an employee. This is not a foreign concept for universities. 
Currently, part-time student jobs at university recreational centers, 
libraries, and administration are common. This proposal does not even 
amount to such a degree. 
 
 150. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1076 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984)). 
 151. Hruby, supra note 49. 
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The California Labor Code exception should be amended to allow 
student-athletes to be paid more proportionally for their time. Potential 
pay under an employment scheme should be linked to the universities’ 
overall athletics profits. The DI schools bringing in extreme sums 
would have a greater, more stringent payment plan. This would allow 
protection for the athletes in more intensive programs, versus the 
students who need less protection in lower divisions. 
There are many avenues available to determine compensation 
where scholarships are involved. Potential determination could 
include compensation and protection based on total hours surpassing 
the amount of scholarship received. Scholarships amount to a full-time 
student athlete, typically twenty-five to forty hours per week of school 
and athletics. So, time put in greater than such should be compensated. 
Collegiate athletes are the celebrities of their campus, yet there is 
a dark underbelly of exploitation and control that few outsiders 
witness. SB 206 must be expanded to allow both universities and the 
NCAA to pay their athletes for their name and likeness. Additionally, 
this clearly dictates a change in public policy calling for a 
corresponding change to amateurism. The California Labor Code must 
be amended to require high profiting schools with rigorous programs 
to compensate and protect their athletes like employees. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
SB 206 reveals decades of deep-rooted dissent among critics of 
academic compensation. Many believe the end of amateurism would 
bring about the exploitation of young athletes. But they fail to 
acknowledge that young athletes are already facing such exploitation. 
They are plagued with an inability to financially support themselves 
while playing high-level collegiate sports. Under this rule of law, the 
California courts and legislature have always upheld the big business 
of collegiate sports above the rights of student-athletes. The NCAA 
and their bottomless resources have dominated in numerous cases, 
subjugating their athletes as amateurs. SB 206 makes a necessary 
change to this traditional view of amateurism, but it does not go far 
enough. 
With the passing of SB 206, problems remain: the current 
California labor exception directly contradicts public policy while 
promoting an outdated view of student athletes and undermining their 
only opportunity to capitalize on their publicity. This massive shift in 
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California public policy must be reflected in other areas of the law, 
outside of SB 206. Employment law shields college athletes from a 
hope of protection. This Note purports a two-fold solution: SB 206 
should be expanded to allow universities to pay their athletes for their 
name and likeness and the California Labor Code should allow 
student-athletes employee protections. California must protect this 
class of young, hardworking, and incredibly talented citizens. 
 
